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THE ILLINOIS PARENTAL NOTICE ABORTION
ACT: LEGAL AND ETHICAL
RAMIFICATIONS OF A
PHYSICIAN'S DECISION
TO GIVE PARENTAL NOTIFICATION
On November 2, 1983, the Illinois General Assembly, overriding a gubernatorial veto, enacted into law the Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act (Act).1 The provisions of the Act require
physicians to notify both parents or the legal guardian of unemancipated minor 2 patients of their intention to perform an abortion, 3 to
delay the procedure for at least twenty-four hours after notice has
been given, 4 or to delay the procedure until such time as a minor
who objects to such notice has obtained a court order waiving the
notice requirement.5 After careful consideration of the Act in light
1. S. 521, 83rd General Assembly, P.A. 83-890, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5340
(West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-61 et seq. This Act repealed
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.3 [Parental Consultation]).
2. As used throughout this Act, "unemancipated minor" means any minor
who is not now nor has ever been married nor has not by court order otherwise
been freed from the care, custody and control of her parents. 1983 Ill. Legis.
Serv. at 5341 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 81-63(b)).
3. For purposes of this Act, "abortion" is defined as "the use of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or device with intent to terminate
the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant with intent other than to
cause live birth." 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. at 5341 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 81-63 (d)).

4. Section 4(a) provides in full:
No person shall perform an abortion upon an unemancipated minor or
upon an incompetent unless he or his agent has given at least 24 hours actual notice to both parents or to the legal guardian of the minor pregnant
woman or incompetent of his intention to perform the abortion or unless
he or his agent has received a written statement or oral communication by
another physician, hereinafter called the "referring physician," certifying
that the referring physician or his agent has given such notice.
1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. at 5341 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8164(a)).
5. "A minor or incompetent who objects to notice... may petition, on her
own behalf or by next friend, the circuit of the county in which the minor resides or in which the abortion is to be performed for a waiver of the notice
requirement .... ." Id. (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-64(c)).
Notice may be waived if the court finds that the minor is sufficiently mature
and well-informed to make the abortion decision on her own or that notification
would not be in the best interest of the minor. Id. at 5342 (to be codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-65(d)(i)(ii)).
In addition to judicial waiver, there are several other exceptions to the notice requirement. Section 6 states that the notice requirement shall not apply
"when, in the best medical judgment of the physician on the facts of the case
before him, a medical emergency exists that so complicates the pregnancy as to
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of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, 6 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found the
twenty-four hour waiting period and the judicial alternative to pa7
rental notification sections of the Act constitutionally defective.
require an immediate abortion." Id. (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 81-66). Section 7(a) eliminates the 24-hour notice requirement when notice
has been given and the parties to whom such notice is due accompany the minor
or incompetent to the place where the abortion is to be performed or submit
notarized statements indicating they have been properly notified. Id. at 5343 (to
be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-67 (a)). Notice to a minor's father is
also not necessary if the mother accompanies her and submits a notarized statement of notification and states orally to the physician that she has a reasonable
belief that the father of the unborn child is the minor's father. Id. (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch 38, § 81-67(b)).
Section 5 delineates the procedure for waiver of notice. A minor or incompetent may participate on her own behalf in the proceeding. The court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem for her and advise her that she has a right to court
appointed counsel, available upon her request. Court proceedings shall be confidential and shall be given precedence to ensure a prompt decision. The circuit
court is also required to rule within 48 hours of the application. Id. at 5342 (to
be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-65(b)(c)).
Section 5(e) requires that a confidential record of the evidence be maintained. If a court denies waiver of notice, section 5(f) authorizes an expedited
confidential appeal as provided by Illinois Supreme Court Rules. Section 5(g)
respectfully requests the supreme court to promulgate rules and regulations
necessary to ensure that proceedings are handled expeditiously and confidentially. Id. at 5341 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-65(e)(f)(g)).
6. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 459 U.S.
814 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
7. Shortly before the Act was to take effect on January 31, 1984, a class
action suit was filed. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, No. 84 C771 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 30,
1984). This action was brought on behalf of all duly licensed physicians, surgeons, and medical researchers presently performing or desiring to perform
abortions in the State of Illinois, and on behalf of certain of their patients. Id. at
1454. The patients in the plaintiff case included: (1) unemancipated minors allegedly capable of giving informed consent to an abortion procedure and those
unemancipated minors whose best interest would not be served by notice to
both parents or to a legal guardian; and (2) adjudicated disabled persons for
whom a guardian had been appointed, pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2
§ lla-3(a)(1) or § lla-3(a)(3), whose disability allegedly did not impair ability to
give informed consent or whose best interests would not be served by notice to
the guardian. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
The plaintiffs, requesting a preliminary injunction or, alternatively, a temporary restraining order, alleged that the 24-hour waiting period between notification and performance of an abortion unconstitutionally burdened the rights
of such patients to obtain an abortion. Id. at 1454. The plaintiffs also alleged
that the 24-hour period burdened the rights of physicians to perform abortions
consistently with their best medical judgment. Id. at 1458. Plaintiffs contended
that the procedure for obtaining judicial waiver was constitutionally inadequate
because it failed to assure expedited resolution of an appeal from the trial
court's ruling on such a petition, it failed to adequately guarantee that the petition proceedings would be completely anonymous, and it failed to provide for
assistance to the minor in the filing of the petition for judicial waiver. Id. at
1460-62. The district court entered a temporary restraining order on January
26, 1984. Id. at 1454.
On May 14, 1984, the district court determined the constitutionality of the
Act. The district court first addressed the 24-hour waiting period required by
Section 4(a). Zbaraz, 584 F. Supp. at 1458. In reaching its conclusion, the dis-
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Notwithstanding the constitutional debate surrounding the
technical requirements of the Act,8 an examination of the present
Illinois statutory requirement of parental notice reveals the serious
legal and ethical dilemma it poses for members of the medical profession. This dilemma arises from the drafters' failure to consider
physicians' professional and legal obligation to preserve the confidentiality of information acquired within the physician-patient relationship.' As a result of this legislative oversight, a physician
trict court relied on City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983), and Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n,
Inc. v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1983). In Akron, the Court found the 24hour waiting period unduly burdened an adult woman's abortion choice by causing delay. 103 S. Ct. at 2503. Such delay increased the cost and scheduling
problems of an abortion by requiring a woman to make two trips to the clinic,
resulting in a delay of more than 24-hours. Id. In Pearson, the Seventh Circuit
held that an abortion could not be delayed once notice had been effected upon a
minor's parents. 716 F.2d at 1143. Although the considerations with respect to
minors and adults are different, the district court concluded that the 24-hour
waiting period was constitutionally defective. Zbaraz, 584 F. Supp. at 1459.
The district court next addressed the judicial alternative to notice issue.
The court began its analysis by noting that "[t]he State's interest in protecting
immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent or notice substitute,
either parental or judicial." Id. The state, however, must "assure that an adequate alternative procedure is available to create an 'opportunity for case-bycase evaluations of the maturity of pregnant minors.'" Id. (quoting Akron, 103
S. Ct. at 2499, quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 n.29). The alternative
procedure must "assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals therefrom, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide for
an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." Zbaraz, 584 F. Supp. at
1459 (quoting Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644).
In Bellotti, the Court construed a Massachusetts statute which required
that a pregnant minor seeking an abortion obtain the consent of her parents.
The Court held that the statute was constitutionally defective because "it requires parental consultation or notification in every instance, without affording
the pregnant minor an opportunity to receive an independent judicial determination that she is mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in her
best interests." Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 651. Thus, "[i]f she satisfies the court that
she is mature and well enough informed to intelligently make the abortion decision, the court may authorize her to act without parental consultation." Id. at
647. Although the Court's view of alternative procedures has been considered
in the context of parental consent statutes, it is also applicable to parental notification provisions. See Pearson, 716 F.2d at 1131-32. Accordingly, the Zbaraz
court found the alternative procedure to notification constitutionally defective.
585 F. Supp. at 1459-1462.
8. While the Act is silenced for the moment, the controversy will continue
because an appeal of the district court's ruling is forthcoming. Notice of appeal
was filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on June
6, 1984. Even if the district court's decision is upheld, it is likely that the Act
will be reenacted in an effort to comply with constitutional requirements.
Judge Will, in his opinion in Zbaraz, discussed a number of other difficulties
with the Act, although not raised explicitly by the parties, because of his belief
that the Act would be redrafted by the Illinois legislature. Zbaraz, 584 F. Supp.
at 1464-65.
9. A physician-patient relationship is established when a patient accepts
professional services from a physician for the purposes of care and treatment.
Thoren, The Physician-PatientPrivilege, 1983 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 61, 64-65.
Actual treatment is not required, however, to establish a patient-physician rela-
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contemplating compliance with the Act will be forced to make some
very sensitive decisions.

As a practical matter, most physicians will attempt to comply
with the Act by advising their minor patient of the notification requirement before the abortion is performed. Although many minors may oppose parental notification and would strenuously object
to such notification being given, most minors presumably will acquiesce to notice in order to obtain the abortion. Despite this involuntary consent to notice, a physician's compliance with the Act

discloses personal information concerning the minor, and therefore,
infringes upon the minor's right to privacy.10 Moreover, physicians
tionship. Id. The requisite physician-patient relationship exists if the patient
consults a physician for "curative" treatment. Id. This situation must be distinguished from that where a physician is consulted only for examination. No
physician-patient relationship exists between an examining physician and the
party being examined. See also J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2382 (McNaughton

rev. 1961) (physician-patient relationship established only if physician consulted
for purposes of treatment or for diagnosis in anticipation of treatment); Note,
Confidential Relationships: Does the Law Require Silence Outside the Courtroom, 6 UTAH L. REV. 380, 387-88 (1959) (subject matter must be communicated
to the physician by the patient in the course of securing treatment and must be
of such a nature as would have remained undisclosed except in the process of
securing help). A minor who informs or communicates to a physician a request
for an abortion discloses information necessary for the performance of the physician's duty. Accordingly, the requisite physician-patient relationship is established.
In order to make an informed diagnosis and to render proper treatment, a
physician requires full and detailed information. Challenrer, The Doctor-Patient Relationship and the Right to Privacy, 11 U. Pir. L. REV. 624 (1950).
When a patient seeks professional treatment and retains a physician, the patient must admit the most intimate and private details of his or her mind and
body. Because a patient is unfamiliar with what information is relevant to his
treatment, the patient must disclose all information to his physician. Aranoff &
Hirsh, Confidential CommunicationsBetween Physician and Patient in Judicial and AdministrativeProceedings, 1983 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 331, 333. This

information is likely to be very personal, highly confidential, and potentially
damaging or embarrassing if revealed elsewhere. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965). Thus, some guarantee of
confidentiality is required to ensure complete trust between patient and physician. Note, Legal Protection of the Confidential Nature of the Physician-Patient Relationship, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 383, 384 (1952).

To encourage both trust and uninhibited communication between patient
and physician and to protect the patient from the embarrassment which an unauthorized disclosure might cause, the legal and medical professions recognize
certain communications between patient and physician as privileged. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801. See also Comment, The Physician-PatientPrivilege,
56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 263, 266-67 (1961) (fear of perjury by physician arising from
conflict between ethical duty of silence and legal duty of disclosure and outrage
and repugnance of physician acting against patient's interest render additional
support for extending privilege of silence to the medical profession). Consequently, a physician is under a legal and professional obligation to keep communications acquired during the physician-patient relationship confidential. C.
DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 23

(1958).
10. Privacy cases involve at least two different kinds of interests. One is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. The other is the
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complying with this statutory requirement of parental notification
individual interest in making certain kinds of important decisions without interference. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). In the context of parental notification requirements, involving the minor's parents against the minor's
wishes effectively cancels her right to avoid disclosure of the fact that she is
seeking an abortion. Besides revealing a confidential decision, parental notice
requirements may limit "access to the means of effectuating that decision." Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977).
One of the first explicit recognitions of the constitutional right of privacy
came in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme
Court invalidated a Connecticut statute prohibiting married persons from using
any drugs, medicinal articles or instruments for the purpose of preventing conception. Id. at 480. Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a
right of privacy, the Court recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, exists under the Constitution. Id. at
483. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the intimacies of the marital relationship and the right of contraceptive use were within a zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. Id. at 485. In Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Supreme Court invalidated a Massachusetts
statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives by licensed physicians or pharmacists to married persons. Id. at 453. The Court held that the right of access
to contraceptives extended to single as well as married persons. Id. Finally, in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court concluded that the right of
privacy, grounded in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the constitution, was
"broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy." Id. at 153. In Roe, the Court invalidated a Texas statute making abortions illegal except when necessary to preserve the life of the mother.
Id. at 164. Even though the Court determined that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy was fundamental, it rejected the notion that "the woman's
right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever
time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses." Id. at 153.
The Supreme Court stressed that the woman's right must be balanced against
the state's right to protect potential life and safeguard maternal and infant
health. Id. at 154. In balancing these interests, the Court identified three stages
of pregnancy and defined the limits of state power to regulate abortion during
each of these stages:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment
of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if
it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. ...
[This] decision leaves the State free to place increasing restrictions on
abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions
are tailored to the recognized state interests. The decision vindicates the
right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests provide
compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision,
and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.
Id. at 164-66.
In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the companion case to Roe, the Court
struck down provisions of a Georgia statute which required that abortions be
given only in accredited hospitals, that hospital board of directors give approval
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risk breaching their professional ethical responsibility, as stated in
the Hippocratic Oath and Principles of Medical Ethics, which compels them to maintain confidentiality in the provision of medical
services. Finally, the far-reaching legal consequence of a physician's decision to notify parents of his intention to perform an abortion is the potential liability for disclosure of this confidential
medical information.
This comment examines the legal and ethical aspects of a physician's decision to give parental notification as required by the Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act.'1 The comment begins by
to any abortion, and that two physicians in addition to the attending doctor acquiesce in the abortion decision. Id. at 183-84. The Court held that these procedural requirements were constitutionally invalid because they failed to
distinguish between the changing degree of state interests duriag the three trimesters of pregnancy and because they unduly burdened the patient's and physician's rights. Id. at 201-02.
Since Roe, the Court has applied the basic principle that a woman has a
fundamental right to make the highly personal choice of whether or not to terminate her pregnancy to minors. The question of whether a minor has a fundamental constitutional right of privacy in the abortion context was first
considered in Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
In Danforth, the Court invalidated a provision of a Missouri statute imposing a
flat parental consent requirement on abortion decisions of unmarried pregnant
women under the age of 18 years. Id. at 72. The Court held that the minor's
privacy right in an abortion decision outweighed the interests of parents and
thus precluded the state from giving an arbitrary veto power to third parties.
Id. at 74. The Court went on to note that "Constitutional rights do not mature
and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Id. Accordingly, the Court extended to minors the
fundamental right to decide whether or not to bear a child. Id. at 75.
Although the Danforth court recognized that a right of privacy exists, it
also recognized that this right is a qualified right. Id. at 74. The Court held that
the minor's privacy right was not coextensive with that of an adult, but rather
was a limited right. Id. The Court has "recognized three reasons justifying the
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children, their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, and the importance of the
parental role in childbearing." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
In recognition of the state's interest in protecting minors and providing for
their welfare, the Danforth court lowered the standard of review in analyzing
minors' rights of privacy. Thus, any state interference with a minor's fundamental right need only be based on a "significantstate interest." Danforth, 428
U.S. at 75. This standard of judicial scrutiny is less rigorous than the "compelling state interest" test applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of adults.
Although the Court has yet to articulate the precise scope of this test, a state
attempting to burden a minor's fundamental privacy right presumably must
justify the burden by more than a bare assertion that the burden is connected to
the significant interest.
11. In addition to Illinois, other state legislatures have formulated or attempted to formulate similar parental notice statutes. The Indiana statute, IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5(a) (Burns 1979), requiring 24-hour actual notice for
an unemancipated minor under 18 years of age, was found unconstitutional in
Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n, Inc. v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127 (7th
Cir. 1983). The Louisiana statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:12.35, 35.5 (West
Supp. 1980), requiring 24-hour actual notice or 72-hour constructive notice to

1985]

Physician's Ethical Duties and ParentalNotice

considering

the fundamental

legal issue created

by the Act:

parent or legal guardian of all unmarried women under 18 years of age, was
found unconstitutional in Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 205 (E.D.
La. 1980). The Maine statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597.2 (1980), requiring 24-hour actual notice or 48-hour constructive notice to a parent or legal
guardian of unemancipated women under 17 years of age, was enjoined in Women's Community Health Center Inc., v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 546-48 (D. Me.
1979). The Maryland statute, MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1982), requires notice to a parent or the guardian of minor. The Minnesota statute,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343.2(a) (West 1984), requires 48-hour written notice to
parents of an unemancipated minor. The Missouri statute, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1983), requiring notice to parents of pregnant woman
under 18 years of age, was held unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood Ass'n
v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 697 (W.D. Mo. 1980), affd, 664 F.2d 687 (8th Cir.
1981). The Montana statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107(b) (1983), requires
written notice to parents for a minor under 18 years of age. The Nebraska statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-333 (1981), requiring a written statement by minor
under 18 years that she has consulted with parent or guardian concerning performance of her abortion, was held unconstitutional in Women's Serv. v. Thone,
690 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1979), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3102 (1983). The North Dakota
statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.-02.1-03(1) (1979), requiring written certification
by a physician to parents at least 24 hours prior to minor's consent to perform
an abortion, was enjoined in Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D. N.D. 1980).
The Tennessee statute, TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-4-202(f) (1982), requires a physician performing an abortion upon a minor less than 18 years of age to inform
her parents two days prior to the abortion. The Utah statute, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-304 (1978), requires a physician to notify, if possible, parents of a minor of
his intent to perform an abortion.
At the federal level, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
proposed similar parental notice requirements. In order to implement what it
felt was the congressional intent behind a 1981 amendment to Title X of the
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(a)-6a (1976 & Supp. V. 1981), HHS
published final regulations articulating parental reporting requirements for
federally-funded family planning projects. See 48 Fed. Reg. 3600 (1983) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59). These regulations required personnel of projects
funded under the Public Health Service Act to notify the parent or guardian of
an unemancipated minor, within ten days, of the initial distribution of any prescriptive contraceptive drugs or devices to the minor. See 48 Fed. Reg. 3600,
3607 (1983) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(12)(i)(A).
Personnel of family planning projects were required to inform a minor,
prior to providing services, that notification was required. Additionally, a minor must be informed that the clinic would have to receive verification of that
notification before additional prescription drugs or devices could be provided.
See 48 Fed. Reg. 3607 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(12)(i)(A)). The only
possible exception to the notification requirement would occur when the project director determined that notification would result in physical harm to the
minor child by the parent or guardian. Id. (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 59.5(a)(12)(i)(B)).
In an effort to forestall implementation of these regulations, several organizations initiated actions in separate federal district courts. In New York v.
Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health and Human Services from
enforcing the regulations. In addressing the validity of the regulations, the
court looked to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction: irreparable
harm and likelihood of success on the merits. With respect to the first element,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs would no doubt suffer irreparable harm.
Id. at 359. The plaintiffs presented statistical and medical documentation that
these regulations would deter adolescents from obtaining prescriptive contraceptives and other family planning services, adolescent pregnancies would in-

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:475

whether compliance with the statutory notice requirement will give
rise to a cause of action against physicians for unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information. The comment next considers whether compliance with the Act will cause physicians to
breach their ethical obligation not to divulge the confidential comcrease and many maladies, such as venereal disease, would not be prevented,
detected or treated. Id. The physician plaintiffs were also threatened with
other irreparable injury, such as loss of reputation and trust among adolescent
clientele. Id. at 360.
Turning to the likelihood of plaintiffs' success on the merits, the court concluded that the regulations constituted a blatant disregard for the purpose of
Title X and therefore had to be invalidated. Id. After reviewing the statutory
language of the 1981 amendment to Title X, its legislative history, and the structure of Title X, the court concluded that the parental notice requirement was
inconsistent with the intent of Congress. Id. at 362. The court reasoned that
although Congress believed minors should encourage family involvement in
their decision to use contraceptives, nothing suggested that Congress intended
to require family participation in such decisions. Id. at 360-61.
On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that federal regulations requiring
federally-funded family planning clinics to notify parents after prescribing contraceptives to unemancipated minors were inconsistent with the laws funding
those clinics. New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983). In order to
implement the 1981 amendments to Title X, the Secretary of HHS had to
choose one of four options. Id. at 1196. These alternatives included suggesting
to minors that parents be involved, notifying parents of the minor's desire to
use Title X contraceptive services, securing parental consent prior to distributing contraceptives to minors, and conferring with the minor and her family
prior to dispensing contraceptives. Id. The Secretary argued that notification
struck a balance between the congressional policy of encouraging family involvement and the policy of preventing unwanted teenage pregnancy. Id. The
Second Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend to require parental involvement but rather to encourage it. Id. at 1197. This encouragement was to
be directed at minors involving parents and not family-planning clinics directly
involving parents. Id.
The second challenge to the federal "squeal rule" also sought injunctive
relief. Four days after the New York v. Heckler decision, the court in Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C.), affd,
Planned Parenthood of Am. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983), reached
the same conclusion. The court noted that the continuing success enjoyed by
family planning clinics was directly attributable to the policy of confidentiality
assured by the clients. Id. at 668. It was clear to the court then that a parental
notification requirement would deter many minors from attending these clinics
which would result in increased pregnancies. Id. Because one of the purposes
of Title X was to reduce the number of unwanted pregnancies, the court concluded that Congress did not intend to reverse its longstanding assurance of
confidentiality in the services provided under Title X. Id. at 668-71.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the
lower court's decision. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d
650 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The court concluded that regulations requiring grantees
funded by HHS to notify parents or a guardian when prescribing contraceptives
to unemancipated minors were inconsistent with Congressional intent and its
purpose in enacting Title X and were thus beyond the limits of the Secretary's
delegated authority. Id. at 665.
Although the federal regulations have not been subsequently reenacted,
they pose the same legal and ethical problems for physicians contemplating the
distribution of contraceptive drugs or devices to unempancipated minor patients. Accordingly, the analysis set forth herein with respect to the Illinois
Parental Notice Abortion Act would also apply to these federal regulations.
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munications of their patients. The comment then considers proposals for possible legislative changes in the Act and concludes with a
Model Parental Notice Statute which may be used a a guideline to
avoid the various legal and ethical pitfalls inherent in the present
Illinois statute.
LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF NOTIFICATION: LIABILITY OF A
PHYSICIAN FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CONFIDENTIAL MEDICAL INFORMATION

No court has considered the liability of a physician who notifies
parents of their minor daughter's decision to terminate a pregnancy. Courts have found physicians liable, however, for unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information under other
circumstances. 12 An examination of these decisions leads to the
conclusion that physicians who comply with the statutory parental
notice requirement may be legally culpable for disclosure of this
personal and confidential treatment.
In 1917, the Supreme Court of Washington rendered one of the
earliest decisions involving the liability of a physician for unauthorized disclosure of a patient's confidential medical information. 13 In
Smith v. Driscoll, the court addressed the narrow issue of whether
a physician who testified in a judicial proceeding and disclosed confidential information acquired by him in his professional capacity
was liable for damages to the patient for so testifying. 14 The court
held that the patient failed to overcome the presumption that the
testimony was privileged. 15 The Smith court in broad dictum suggested, however, that a similar action could exist for out-of-court
disclosure of personal medical history:
Neither is it necessary to pursue at length the inquiry on whether a
cause of action lies in favor of a patient against a physician for wrongfully divulging confidential communications. For the purpose of what
we shall say it will be assumed that,for so palpable a wrong, the law
provides a remedy.16
12. See infra cases cited at notes 20, 35, and 48.
13. Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 162 P. 572 (1917).
14. Id. at 442-43, 162 P. at 573.
15. The Supreme Court of Washington stated that it must be shown that
the ordinary privilege given to a witness was abused. Id. at 443-45, 162 P. at 573.
The court noted that all the testimony given by a witness in the course of a
judicial proceeding was prima facie privileged. Id. Abuse of this privilege
would thus depend on whether the testimony complained of was admissible,
relevant, and pertinent to the issues. Id. If it is not, the physician would be
liable. Id. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed because it failed to set
forth the nature of the action in which the testimony was given and because it
failed to allege that the statements complained of were admissible. Id. See infra note 53 for a discussion of the physician-patient privilege.
16. Smith, 94 Wash. at 442, 162 P. at 572.
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Since Smith, courts have developed three theories to hold a physician liable for unauthorized extrajudicial disclosure of information
acquired during the physician-patient relationship. These theories
include breach of a contractual relationship containing an implied
term of confidentiality, invasion of privacy, and breach of a legally
recognized confidential or privileged relationship between physi17
cian and patient.
Breach of Contract
Courts traditionally view the physician-patient relationship as
a contract of employment.' 8 The physician agrees to provide care
and treatment while the patient agrees to compensate him for these
professional services. 19 Accordingly, a number of jurisdictions recognize a cause of action in contract against a physician for the unauthorized disclosure of a patient's medical history. 20 Jurisdictions
recognizing the contract theory as a basis of liability make it clear,
however, that the action lies only for disclosing information relating either to the patient's mental or physical condition or to the
21
physician's diagnosis or treatment.
17. See infra cases cited at notes 20, 35, and 48.
18. See, e.g., McNamara v. Emmons, 36 Cal. App. 2d 199, 204-05, 97 P.2d 503,
507 (1939) (physician-patient relationship, in its inception, created by express or
implied contract); Ahnert v. Wildman, 176 Ind. App. 630, 376 N.E.2d 1182, 1183
(1978) (relationship between physician and patient may result from express or
implied contract and rights and liabilities of parties governed by general contract law); Lyons v. Grether, 218 Va. 630, 633 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1977) (physician-patient relationship springs from consensual transactions, that is, an
express or implied contract).
19. See Comment, Physicians and Surgeons: Civil Liability For a Physician Who Discloses Medical Information Obtained Within the Doctor-Patient
Relationshipin a NonlitigationSetting, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 658, 662 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Physiciansand Surgeons].
20. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801
(N.D. Ohio 1965) (action against insurance company for inducing physician to
divulge confidential information gained through physician-patient relationship
on pretext that patient was contemplating malpractice suit); Horne v. Patton,
291 Ala. 701, 710-11, 287 So. 2d 824, 831-32 (1974) (action against physician for
damages suffered by physician's disclosure to patient's employer of information
acquired during patient's treatment); Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435,
439, 390 N.E.2d 945, 948 (1979) (action against physician for physician's employee's disclosure of patient's name to police); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 204,
400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 674 (1977) (action against physician and her husband for unlawfully publishing a book containing patient's explicit thoughts, feelings, emotions and fantasies); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D.& C. 543, 548 (1940) (action
by patient's husband against physician for threatened disclosure of medical information concerning his wife); Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389
S.W.2d 249, 252 (1965) (dictum) (action against physician retained by department store for wrongfully disclosing medical report to store's attorney pertaining to plaintiff's alleged injuries).
21. See Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 439, 390 N.E.2d 945, 948
(1979). The Geisberger court noted that those disclosures which violated the
statutory physician-patient privilege would define what would be actionable
under a contract theory. Id. Under the Illinois physician-patient privilege, a
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A physician and patient entering into a contractual relationship
rarely expressly agree that the physician will keep confidential all
personal information given to him by the patient. For the most
part, courts imply an obligation to preserve confidentiality from the
nature of the physician-patient relationship. Implied contractual
terms arise from the conduct of the parties at the time of contracting and from the common usages, practices, and understandings in the community. 22 For instance, in Hammonds v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company,2 3 a federal district court held that a
physician impliedly warrants at the time of contracting that confidential information gained through the relationship will not be released without the patient's permission. 24 The court reasoned that
the public's general knowledge of the medical profession's ethical
obligation contained in the Hippocratic Oath to maintain secrecy
gives every patient the right to rely upon this constructive warranty
of silence. 25 Consequently, a physician who breaches this duty of
confidentiality violates his contractual obligation. Following the
reasoning of the Hammonds court, a physician who complies with a
parental notification requirement risks breaching this implied warranty of confidentiality.
A practical limitation of a contract cause of action lies in establishing compensable damages. 26 The general rule of contract damages is that only those items of damages reasonably foreseeable by
the parties as a direct result of the breach are compensable. 27 Furphysician is precluded from disclosing information necessary to treat the patient. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-802 (1983). Because the disclosure involved in
Geisbergerwas only the name of the plaintiff, the disclosure was not within the
scope of the privilege. 72 Ill. App. 3d at 438, 390 N.E.2d at 947. See infra note 53
for a discussion of the physician-patient privilege.
22. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8 (1982). See also infra note 25
and accompanying text.
23. 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
24. Id. at 801.
25. Id. The Hammonds position has generally been adopted in subsequent
cases which have attempted to fashion a remedy based on the contractual nature of physician-patient relationship. See, e.g., Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701,
711, 287 So. 2d 824, 832 (1973) (widespread acquaintance with Hippocratic Oath's
secrecy provision or AMA's Principles of Ethics sufficiently justifies patient's
reasonable expectations of confidentiality); Geisberg v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d
435, 438-39, 390 N.E.2d 945, 948 (1979) (physician-patient testimonial privilege,
Hippocratic Oath, and canons of medical ethics support existence of implied
contract not to disclose confidential medical information).
26. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1019, at 113-15 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1965).
27. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Under the Hadley
rule, the injured party may recover damages for loss that "may fairly and reasonably be considered [as] arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of
things, from such breach of contract itself." Id. at 151. The principle of Hadley
also limits contractual damages to those which "may reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they have made the
contract, as the probable result of the breach of it." Id.
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thermore, damages for mental distress are not granted for breach of
28
contract in the absence of aggravating circumstances.
When a physician notifies parents of their minor daughter's request for an abortion, the minor primarily suffers mental distress.
Yet, the majority of courts would deny recovery because mental distress is not a compensable item of contractual damages. 29 Despite
this general rule, commentators suggest that recovery for mental
distress should be allowed in contracts involving a personal and intimate relationship because the breaching party can reasonably
30
foresee some type of mental suffering.
This is particularly true in the case of parental notification requirements. Minors may not want their parents to be notified of
their request for an abortion because of the strong and painful parental reaction which may follow. 31 This parental reaction is likely
to cause tension between parent and minor, and thereby create an
28. See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1076, at 426 (1964) (damages for mental
suffering frequently awarded where suffering accompanies bodily injury or
where suffering caused in wanton, reckless or intentional manner); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981) (recovery for emotional disturbance
not allowable unless breach causes bodily harm or breach is of such nature that
serious emotional disturbance will result).
29. E.g., MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804
(1982) (recovery for breach of contract limited to economic loss flowing directly
from the breach, thus precluding recovery for mental distress, loss of employment, and deterioration of marriage). See also Archer v. Continental Assurance
Co., 107 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Ky. 1952) (action for damages to business reputation
resulting from defendant's refusal to issue life insurance policy to third party
after authorizing its agent to instruct plaintiff insurance broker that said policy
would be accepted); McClean v. University Club, 327 Mass. 68, 97 N.E.2d 174
(1951) (action for personal injuries allegedly sustained when plaintiff was
evicted from private club).
30. See Note, Action for Breach of Medical Secrecy Outside the Courtroom,
36 U. CIN. L. REV. 103 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as Medical Secrecy]. The
author relies on Corbin's liberal view that there is little difference, theoretically, between contract and tort damages. Both theories should include damages for mental suffering. Yet, the utility of a contract cause of action is
somewhat questionable because of the nonrecognition of damages for emotional
distress. However, the RESTATEMENT OF (SECOND) CONTRACTS may add support to Corbin's liberal view. If the contract is "of such a kind that serious
emotional disturbance was a particularlikely result" the RESTATEMENT would
allow recovery. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353, comment a
(1965) (emphasis added). Contracts of carriers with passengers or guests are
examples of contracts likely to cause serious emotional disturbance. Id. Arguably, breach of contract between physician and patient is just as likely to cause
serious emotional disturbance as breach of a contract between carrier and passenger because of the similar type of duty imposed on the carrier and physician.
Therefore, acceptance of both the Corbin and RESTATEMENT position may result
in an effective cause of action under a contract theory for this medical
disclosure.
31. See Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am. v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658, 664
(D.D.C.), affd, Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (minor affidavit stating, "I absolutely do not want my mother to know
about my sexual activities because I am sure that she would have a strong and
painful reaction if she found out").
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adverse effect on the family relationship. 32 In addition to parental
disappointment and disapproval, the minor may confront physical
or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support, or actual obstruction of the abortion decision, items of damages clearly foreseeable when notice is given. 33 Upon these facts, a viable cause of
action in contract should exist for a physician's disclosure of this
confidential information even though mental distress is not a generally recognized element of contractual damages.
Invasion of Privacy
Courts and commentators recognize invasion of privacy 34 as a
proper basis for a cause of action for a plaintiff seeking redress for
his physician's unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information. 35 In Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Com32. See Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp.
542, 548 (D. Me. 1979) (expert affidavits that some parents "will pressure the
minor, causing great emotional distress and otherwise disrupting the family relationship"); Hoffman, Consent and Confidentiality and Their Legal and Ethical Implications for Adolescent Medicine, in MEDICAL CARE OF THE
ADOLESCENT 42, 52 (J. Gallagher, F. Heald & J. Garrell, 3d ed. 1976) (minors
"might well be talked into terminating the pregnancy in violation of their inner

feelings and beliefs, and suffer guilt and emotional distress the rest of their
lives").
33. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 439 (1981). See also Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp. 997, 1001 (D. Mass. 1978) (uncontested evidence that some parents
"would insist on an undesired marriage, or on continuance of the pregnancy as
punishment" or even physically harm the minor), affd, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
The Secretary of Health and Human Services pointed out that those opposed to the federal parental notice regulations contended that family relationships would be negatively affected. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 3605 (1983). For
example, parents would feel hurt that the child did not confide in them or they
may become angry upon learning that their child was sexually active. Id. As a
consequence, parents may restrict or punish the child or deny the child food and
shelter. Id. Moreover, some critics speculated that communication between
parent and minor would end. Id. This could result in teenagers resorting to
rash measures, such as running away. Id.
34. Invasion of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of torts: publication of
embarrassing private facts; publicity unreasonably placing an individual in a
false light before the public; unreasonable intrusion upon physical solitude or
seclusion; and commercial appropriation of one's name or likeness. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971). At the very least, a
physician's disclosure to a minor's parents of the minor's decision regarding
pregnancy termination constitutes publication of embarrassing private facts.
For a general discussion of the tort of invasion of privacy see Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890). See also Comment, Privacy in Illinois: Torts Without Remedies, 17 J. MAR. L. REV. 799 (1984) (discussing privacy law in Illinois).
35. See, e.g., Mikel v. Abrams, 541 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (action
against physician for discussing with plaintiff's wife during telephone conversation plaintiff's medical condition), affd, 716 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1983); Geisberger
v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979) (action against physician
for disclosing plaintiff's name to police); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405,
240 N.W.2d 333 (1976) (dictum) (petition for writ of prohibition restraining
court from ordering physicians, to whom plaintiff was referred for further
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pany,3 6 the court indicated that an action for damages could lie for a
physician's tortious conduct of revealing medical information or a
confidential communication given in the course of treatment without authorization. 37 The Hammonds court concluded that such an
action existed because a physician not only had an ethical duty to
38
preserve a patient's privacy but a legal duty as well.
The Supreme Court of Alabama in Home v. Patton39 subsequently adopted the Hammonds position. In Home, the patient alleged that his physician's release of his medical record to his
employer constituted an invasion of privacy. 40 The court recognized that a person has a right to be free from unwarranted publication of his private affairs which are not the legitimate concern of
the public. 41 Applying the Hammonds reasoning to the physicianpatient relationship, the Home court concluded that an unauthorized disclosure of intimate details of a patient's medical condition
could also amount to an unwarranted publication of his private affairs. 42 Under the Home rationale, however, the patient must
prove that the disclosure would cause mental suffering, shame, or
43
humiliation in an ordinary reasonable person.
treatment, to appear for private interviews with defendant). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 809-10 (3d ed. 1964); Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43 MINN. L. REV. 943, 946-52 (1959)
(hereinafter cited as Medical Practice] (discussing patient's right to privacy of
confidential information physician acquired during physician-patient
relationship).
36. 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
37. Id. The Hammonds court indicated that:
If a doctor should reveal any of these confidences, he surely effects an invasion of privacy of his patient. We are of the opinion that the preservation of
the patient's privacy is no mere ethical duty upon the part of the doctor;
there is a legal duty as well. The unauthorized revelation of medical
secrets, or any confidential communication given in the course of treatment, is tortious conduct which may be the basis for an action in damages.
Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973).
40. The case arose out of the physician's disclosure to the plaintiff's employer of certain information acquired during the physician-patient relationship. It is worth noting that the disclosure was made contrary to the plaintiff's
express instructions. 291 Ala. at 704, 287 So. 2d at 825.
41. The Home court concluded that an employer was not a person who had
a legitimate interest in knowing every detail of an employee's health. 291 Ala.
at 709-10, 287 So. 2d at 830-36. The court noted that a patient consults a physician for a wide-variety of reasons. 291 Ala. at 710, 287 So. 2d at 830. Moreover,
many of the reasons about which a patient might consult his physician would
have no effect on the patient's employment. Id., 287 So. 2d at 831. Accordingly,
the court held that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the privacy claim. Id., 287 So. 2d at 830-31.
42. Id., 287 So. 2d at 830.
43. Id. See, e.g., Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th
Cir. 1983) (emotional distress and embarrassment are key elements of action for
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Parental notification requirements disclose the minor's private
consultation with her doctor and interject her parents into the very
conference held confidential. Notwithstanding this disclosure, most
authorities contend that a disclosure of private facts to a single individual, or even a small group, fails to amount to a public disclosure. 44 Therefore, because a physician's disclosure is only to the
parents or guardian of an unemancipated minor, a physician who
complies with the Act apparently would not be liable for invasion of
privacy.
Despite the presumption that parental notification is not a public disclosure, the delicacy of the physician-patient relationship
should permit a minor to recover for invasion of privacy even when
the disclosure is limited. 45 This conclusion is logical when one considers the highly sensitive and personal character of the informapublic disclosure of private facts). See also

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652D (1977). Section 652D provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
Id. The rule stated by this section gives protection then only when the publicity
given to a person is such that a reasonable person would feel justified in feeling
seriously aggrieved by it. See id. comment c.
44. See, e.g., Pennison v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617
(La. App. 1963) (husband had right to full report of wife's medical records by
virtue of being head of the household); Beaumont v. Brown, 65 Mich. App. 455,
237 N.W.2d 501 (1975) (invasion of privacy must be accompanied by publicity in
sense of communication to public in general or to large number of persons as
distinguished from one individual or a few), rev 'd, 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522
(1977); Curry v. Corn, 52 Misc. 2d 1035, 277 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1966) (suit against
physician for disclosure of medical records dismissed because information was
given only to plaintiff's husband). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 117, at 810 (4th ed. 1971) (publicity in the sense of a disclosure to
general public or disclosure likely to reach general public); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977) (not invasion of privacy to communicate a fact of plaintiff's life to single person or small group of persons).
The Restatement of Torts distinguishes between "publicity" and "publication." Publication includes only communication by a defendant to a third party.
Publicity, in contrast, means that the matter in question was made public by
either communicating it to the public at large or to so many people that the
matter would be regarded as substantially certain to become public knowledge.
The form of the invasion of the right of privacy covered in section 652D depends
upon publicity given to the individual's private life. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652D comment a (1977) (emphasis added).
45. See Medical Practice, supra note 35, at 947. See also Physicians and
Surgeons, supra note 19, at 109 (disclosing information obtained through the
unique physician-patient relationship may be so outrageous that the publication
requirement should be excluded). One commentator proposes to hold a physician liable in tort through the development of a fifth class of privacy tort. Medical Secrecy, supra note 30, at 109. This class, which would be called "breach of
confidence," would be a recognition of the special characteristic of secrecy in
the patient-physician relationship. This type of action would not only avoid the
problem of damages inherent in the contract theory, but would avoid the publicity requirement as well. Id.
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tion which the physician discloses to the minor's parents. Every
minor woman has certain aspects of her life which she may prefer
to keep confidential. Sexual activity is an example of such an entirely personal matter.46 Critics of parental notification contend
that, despite the limited publication, when a physician reveals intimate details of a minor's sexual activity to the minor's parents, the
physician has acted in a manner which would be highly offensive to
an ordinary reasonable person. 47 Therefore a privacy action should
exist despite the limited publication of the disclosure.
Breach of Confidential Relationship
A number of jurisdictions permit a cause of action against a
physician for disclosure of confidential information on the theory
that such disclosure constitutes a breach of the privileged relationship existing between physician and patient. 48 Jurisdictions adher46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment b (1977).
47. A minor's need for confidentiality is at its greatest level when intimate
issues such as sexuality are involved. This confidentiality need has been recognized by many states through their enactment of statutes providing for confidential treatment of venereal disease. See Note, The Right of Minor to
Confidential Access to Contraceptives, 47 ALB. L. REV. 214, 220 n.35 (1982).
Building on this desire for confidentiality in intimate sexual matters, it would
be inapposite to prohibit a physician to violate confidentiality in venereal disease treatment, but to encourage it by notifying parents of the minor's medical
decision regarding pregnancy termination. See also Note, Breach of Confidence:
An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982). The author asserts:
The more intimate or embarrassing the information, the more damaging
the disclosure probably will be. The wronged party may suffer ridicule,
loss of business or professional reputation, or deterioration of personal relationships. Though injury often flows from widespread publication of disclosed information, the greatest injury may well be caused by disclosure to
a single person, such as an employer or a spouse [or a parent].
Id. at 1435 (emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 795802 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (action against insurance company for inducing physician
to divulge confidential information gained through physician-patient relationship); Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979) (action
against physician for disclosing patient's name to police); Hannaway v. Cole, 2
Mass. App. 847, 311 N.E.2d 924, 925 (1974) (dictum) (action against psychiatrist
for revealing to third persons confidential information acquired during physician-patient relationship); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 411, 240
N.W.2d 333, 337 (1976) (dictum) (physician who discloses confidential information about his patient to a third person during a private interview may be subject to tort liability); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D. 2d 482, 487, 446 N.Y.S.2d
801, 802-805 (1982) (psychiatrist's disclosure, without consent and without justification, of personal information to plaintiff's wife violated fiduciary responsibility implicit in physician-patient relationship); Felis v. Greenberg, 51 Misc. 2d
881, 883, 273 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (1966) (furnishing of information by physician to
insurance company without patient's authorization was in violation of privileged and confidential relationship of physician and patient); Alexander v.
Knight, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (1962) (dictum) (physician who submitted a report on a patient to a doctor employed by patient's adversary in litigation breached confidentiality of physician-patient relationship); Schaffer v.
Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134, 136-38 (S.D. 1974) (psychiatrist who breaches physician-
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ing to this theory recognize that the confidential nature of the
49
physician-patient relationship itself gives rise to a cause of action.
These courts conclude that there are certain legal obligations inherent in the physician-patient relationship. One such legal obligation
on the physician's part is the duty to preserve the confidentiality of
50
disclosures made by a patient.
This legal duty of confidentiality derives from three sources.
First, the Hippocratic Oath and many modern ethical codes adopted
by the medical profession formally acknowledge secrecy as an obligation of the physician to the patient.51 Second, state medical licensing statutes, which provide for revocation of a physician's license if
he engages in unprofessional conduct, often define such conduct to
include betrayal of professional secrets. 52 The third source of this
patient privilege by making unauthorized disclosures of confidential medical information may be liable for breach of that duty); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d
191, 196, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (1958) (dictum) (physician who published derogatory
matter concerning his patient may be liable for breach of obligation not to reveal information obtained in confidence during physician-patient relationship).
But see Mikel v. Abrams, 541 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (Missouri does not
recognize cause of action for breach of duties inherent in physician-patient relationship), affd, 716 F.2d 907 (1983); Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp.
1328 (D.D.C. 1978) (privileged or confidential physician-patient relationship
does not give rise to cause of action under law of District of Columbia); Collins
v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322 (D. Ga. 1957) (absence of physician-patient privilege
statute precluded patient's recovery for physician's disclosure of results of a
blood test); Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965) (absence
of physician-patient privileged communications statute failed to impose duty
upon physician to treat medical report as confidential).
49. See, e.g., Hales v. Pittman, 18 Ariz. 305, 576 P.2d 493 (1978) (relationship
between physician and patient is one of trust and confidence which obligates
physician to exercise utmost good faith); Cannell v. Medical & Surgical Clinics,
S.C., 21 Ill. App. 3d 373, 315 N.E.2d 278 (1974) (responsibility of physicians and
hospitals to protect patient's medical facts from extrajudicial disclosures springs
from confidential nature of physician-patient relationship); Alexander v.
Knight, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962) (members of medical profession
stand in confidential or fiduciary capacity as to their patients).
50. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. at 799;
Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. at 701, 287 So. 2d at 829-30; Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J.
at 336, 181 A.2d at 348-49.
51. See infra note 86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hippocratic Oath.
52. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2263 (West. Supp. 1984) (willful,
unauthorized violation of professional confidence constitutes unprofessional
conduct); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285(13) (West. Supp. 1979) (unprofessional
conduct); Rules of the Board of Regents, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE. tit. ViIi, § 29.1(b)(8)
(1979) (professional conduct includes "revealing personally identifiable facts,
data, or information obtained in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the patient or client"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(A)(4) (Page
1977) (wilfully betraying a professional secret).
In Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1960), the physician
licensing statute provided that revealing information obtained in a professional
capacity relating to the patient or his record, without first obtaining the patient's consent, would constitute unprofessional conduct in the practice of
medicine. In seeking a source of duty of secrecy, the court considered the licensing statute along with the testimonial privilege statute and concluded that
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duty is derived from testimonial privilege statutes. 53 Courts have
disclosure of medical information was plainly reprehensible and thus gave the
patient a cause of action against the physician. 29 Misc. 2d at 792-93, 208
N.Y.S.2d. at 567.
In Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920), a statute provided that a physician's license to practice medicine could be revoked if the physician was found guilty of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. The statute
listed betrayal of a professional secret to the detriment of a patient as misconduct. The court thus held that unauthorized disclosure of confidential information by a physician would give rise to an action for damages. 104 Neb. at 227-28,
177 N.W. at 832. But see Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249
(1965) (medical licensing statute held to be merely administrative provision
concerning physician licensing which gave no right to recovery for wrongful
disclosure of medical reports).
53. Unlike the attorney-client privilege, it was generally accepted at common law that a patient had no privilege to keep a physician from disclosing
information obtained in the course of the physician-patient relationship. 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5230 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Such was the common
law rule regardless of whether the disclosure was made in court or out of court.
Alabama Section, Tort-Confidential Communication-A Physician Is Under
General Duty Not To Disclose Information Obtained in the Courseof a DoctorPatient Relationship, 26 ALA. L. REV. 485, 486 (1974).
The rationale underlying the common law rule was that a physician testifying in the courtroom should be compelled to disclose information in order for
justice to be obtained. The most widely cited common law case supporting this
rationale was The Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 573 (1776), discussed in C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 98, at 2128 n.2 (2d ed. 1972).
That case involved a bigamy action in which Lord Mansfield faced the question
of whether a physician must breach his honor and disclose the marital status of
the plaintiff and defendant which he had learned through treatment of the parties. When asked if he knew of the marriage between the defendant and her
alleged husband, the physician stated, "I do not know how far anything that has
come before me in a confidential trust in my profession should be disclosed,
consistent with my professional honor." Id. Lord Mansfield noted that, if a
surgeon voluntarily reveals these secrets, he would be guilty of a breach of
honor and great indiscretion. However, "to give that information in a court of
justice, which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be imputed to
him as any indiscretion whatever." Id.
Despite disavowance at common law, many jurisdictions subsequently enacted statutory provisions which protected from disclosure certain information
acquired by a physician within the physician-patient relationship. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 n.5 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961), for a compilation of
jurisdictions having physician-patient privileged communication statutes. This
statutory physician-patient privilege, which was first introduced in New York
in 1829, was a rule of evidence which prevented a physician from being compelled to testify in a judicial proceeding about confidential communications obtained during the physician-patient relationship. The statute, reprinted in C.
MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 101 (2d ed. 1972) provided:
No person authorized to practice physic or surgery shall be allowed [while
testifying in court] to disclose any information which he may have acquired
in attending any patient, in a professional character, and which information
was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or
to do any act for him as a surgeon.
Id., quoting REV. STAT. 1829, vol. II, part III, c.7, tit. 2, art. eight, § 73. The purpose of the statutory privilege was "to promote health, not truth. It encouraged
free disclosure in the sickroom by preventing disclosure in the courtroom." C.
MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 102, at 218 (2d ed. 1972).
The requirements for a testimonial physician-patient privilege are that the
information be (1) a confidential communication, (2) with a physician in his
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broadly interpreted the medical professions' code of ethics, the state
medical licensing statutes, and the testimonial privilege statutes as
an expression of public policy favoring a general duty to prevent
extrajudicial disclosure of information acquired in the course of the
54
physician-patient relationship.
A minor's strongest theory for recovery appears to be an action
for breach of confidence because of the potential limitations associated with the causes of action based on breach of contract and invasion of privacy. The physician-patient relationship contemplates a
legal duty of nondisclosure on the part of the physician. Accordingly, a breach of this legal duty is actionable in tort. 55 The advanprofessional capacity, and (3) necessary for obtaining the benefits of the professional relationship. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 2381-84 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961). Another commentator contends that four conditions must be met before
the privilege can be asserted: (a) the person sought to be silenced by assertion
of the privilege must have been a physician at the time he acquired the information; (b) the information must have been gained in the course of a physicianpatient relationship; (c) the disclosure must relate to "communication" or "information" as used in the privilege statute; and (d) the communication of information must have been "necessary" to treatment of the patient. Note, Legal
Protectionof the Confidential Nature of the Physician-PatientRelationship, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 383, 390-91 (1952).
Although the privilege is generally confined to information concerning the
patient's medical condition or the physician's diagnosis and treatment, the scope
of the privilege in a particular jurisdiction depends on the express words of the
statute. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (1956) (all communications
between physician and patient privileged); CAL. EVID. CODE § 992 (West) (1966)
(any information obtained by examination of the patient); IDAHO CODE § 9-203
(1980) (information gathered by physician through his examination or observation of the patient); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-802 (1983) (any information acquired in attending patient in a professional character); VA. CODE § 8.08-399
(1950) (any information acquired in attending, examining, or treating patient in
a professional capacity). Because the physician-patient privilege is a personal
right of the patient, it may be asserted or waived only by the patient. Chaffee,
PrivilegedCommunications:Is JusticeServed or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 614 (1942).
54. A recent decision illustrative of this broad interpretation of testimonial
privilege statutes is Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1979). In Doe,
the plaintiff, a former patient of the defendant psychiatrist, brought suit against
the psychiatrist and her husband. The plaintiff alleged that defendants invaded
her privacy by publishing a book which revealed the plaintiff's most intimate
feelings, emotions, and fantasies. 93 Misc. 2d at 204-05, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 671. The
court held that a physician who enters into a physician-patient relationship impliedly covenants to keep confidential all disclosures made during this relationship. Id. at 210, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 674. In reaching this holding, the court relied on
public policy. The court engaged in an extensive look at the state licensing and
disciplinary statute as well as the testimonial privilege statute. Id. at 208-09, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 673. The court concluded that the legislature intended those statutory and regulatory schemes to go beyond judicial proceedings. Id. The court
thus reasoned that the testimonial statute should have a broad and liberal construction to carry out the intended public policy. Id. This policy was prohibiting physicians from disclosing without authorization information acquired
during the physician-patient relationship. Id., 400 N.Y.S.2d at 672-73.
55. One commentator has suggested that cases dealing with liability for
breach of confidence, under the guise of various legal theories, suggest the
emergence of a new tort of breach of confidence. Note, Breach of Confidence:
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tage of the breach of confidence tort theory is that a successful
minor will be able to recover damages for mental distress, humiliation, loss of reputation and possibly deterioration of the family
56
relationship.
The preceding discussions indicate that a prima facie case can
be established for imposing liability on a physician who, with or
without the minor's authorization, discloses confidential information obtained in the course of the physician-patient relationship.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Hague v. Williams,5 7 recognized, however, that certain "exceptions prompted by the supervening interest of society" 58 limit a patient's right against such
disclosure. Because a physician's obligation of confidentiality is not
absolute, disclosure is permitted under compelling circumstances. 59
An application of the Hague doctrine to parental notification requirements results in the conclusion that a physician who notifies
parents of their minor daughter's medical decision regarding abortion will be liable for giving such notice only if it was given without
justification. 60 A physician can justify his disclosure of confidential
a genmedical information by alleging patient consent or waiver, 61
eral public health and welfare interest, or legal compulsion.
An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1450 (1982). The tort is defined as
"the unconsented, unprivileged, disclosure to a third party of non-public information that the defendant has learned within a confidential relationship." Id.
at 1455. Although traditional theories of liability offer legal redress for disclosures in breach of confidence, the author contends that they fail to recognize
the distinct interests present in a confidential relationship and that the doctrinal limits make them ill-suited to enforcement of confidences. Id. at 1426.
56. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971).
57. 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962).
58. Id. 37 N.J. at 336, 181 A.2d at 349. In Hague, the parents of an infant
brought suit against a physician for unauthorized disclosure to an insurance
company. The parents had applied for life insurance on the infant because of a
congenital heart defect. The conflict arose when the physician disclosed the
medical history of the deceased infant patient to the patient's life insurers. The
court held that the parents lost the right to their confidentiality by the act of
filing a claim with their insurer involving the patient's health. The court reasoned that when the physical condition of a patient is made an element of a
claim, "the public interest in a honest and just result assumes dominance over
the individual's right of nondisclosure." Id.
59. See Medical Practice,supra note 35, at 954.
60. Before one can justify wrongful acts, a wrong must have been committed. Despite the authority supporting a cause of action against a physician, a
patient will prevail only if he can plead and prove compensable damages. For
purpose of this comment, it has been assumed that a minor can meet this burden. Various items of damages a minor could plead and conceivably recover
include loss of reputation, emotional disturbance, and loss of family
relationship.
61. See Physicians and Surgeons, supra note 19, at 669-71 (discussing affirmative defenses available to defendant physicians).
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Patient Consent or Waiver
A patient may consent to a physician notifying her parents of
her abortion decision. A patient may also waive her right to confidentiality. Accordingly, a valid consent or knowing waiver will defeat a cause of action based on improper disclosure of confidential
information. 62 However, a patient must fully understand all the
relevant circumstances before a valid consent or knowing waiver
will be an affirmative defense. 63 The Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act requires a minor to be advised of the notification requirement before abortion services are initially provided. 64 A minor can
then decide either to accept medical treatment subject to parental
notification or to refuse the treatment entirely. Thus, by accepting
services prior to any medical treatment, the minor, arguably, consents to notice.

65

The argument that acceptance of clinical services effectuates
valid consent to parental notice is not persuasive. In Planned
ParenthoodFederationof America v. Schweiker,66 a federal district
court reasoned that in making consent to notification a condition of
medical services, a minor's consent is essentially coerced. 67 The
court concluded that the threatened breach of a physician's obligation to ensure confidentiality would still exist whether or not consent was forcibly extracted prior to providing services. 68 This
reasoning is persuasive when one considers that most minors will
not want their parents to be notified of their abortion decision.
Nonetheless, because the minor still wants to secure an abortion,
she will acquiesce to notice. If a minor truly wants an abortion, she
is, in effect, coerced into consenting to the notification. Therefore, a
62. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2386-88 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
63. See Medical Practice,supra note 35, at 952.
64. See supra note 4.
65. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 3603.
66. 559 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C. 1983), affd sub nom. Planned Parenthood
Fed'n of Am. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
67. Planned Parenthood, 559 F. Supp. at 666. The Planned Parenthood
court noted that a family planning clinic's duty of confidentiality to participants
had long been recognized as sacred. Id. This was particularly the case when
sensitive information, such as medical decisions about birth control, was involved. Because of this long-standing obligation to ensure confidentiality, the
court concluded that:
the essentially coercive circumstances under which a minor makes her
"choice" does not act to vitiate the breach of confidentiality that notification entails. Confidentiality in the patient-physician context encompasses
the private and privileged nature of all information conveyed in a health
care transaction, including the knowledge that such a transaction is taking
place. The threatened breach of a physician's obligation to ensure confidentiality exists whether or not a waiver can be forcibly extracted prior to
providing services.

Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
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minor's involuntary consent to parental notification probably would
be insufficient to insulate the physician from liability.
A minor may also waive her right to confidential treatment. To
constitute a valid waiver, however, there must be a knowing, intentional and voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of some
known right or privilege. 69 Under this definition, any waiver of
confidentiality which is made a condition of receiving medical treatment would not be a knowing and voluntary waiver. Therefore,
unless a minor voluntarily and willingly waives this right to confidential medical treatment, a physician should be precluded from asserting waiver as an affirmative defense.
Disclosure in Public Interest
A second ground for justifying a physician's disclosure is the
general public health and welfare interest. 70 Where the public interest or the private interest of a patient so demands, disclosure
may be made to a person having a legitimate interest in the patient's health. 71 Courts generally favor disclosure either when the
public health is threatened or when the patient himself is
threatened. 72 To escape liability for disclosure, a physician attempting to justify parental notification might show that notice was given
because certain competing interests outweighed the minor's interest in confidentiality. 73 Thus, the question which arises is whether
there is a countervailing interest to which the minor's interest must
69. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also BALLANTINE'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1356 (3d ed. 1969) (voluntary and intentional relinquishment
of a known and existing right or such conduct warranting an inference of relinquishment of such right).
70. Three overriding interests may justify violating the patient's confidence: (1) when others are endangered by the patient's condition, (2) when various societal interests are involved, and (3) when the patient's health is in
question. Medical Practice,supra note 35, at 954-61.
71. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 137, 529 P.2d 553, 561 (1974) (protective privilege ends where public
peril begins) subsequent op. on reh., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d
334 (1976); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D. 2d 482, 487, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805
(1981) (physician required to disclose to extent needed to protect threatened
interest); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 196-97, 331 P.2d 814, 817-18 (justification or excuse depends upon a showing of circumstances and competing interests supporting need for disclosure).
72. See, e.g., Iverson v. Franksen, 237 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1956) (psychologist's disclosure of child's I.Q. test results to child's school guidance counselor);
Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (physician's disclosure
to hotel owner that the guest, the patient, had a contagious disease); Clark v.
Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 207 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (physician's disclosure
to government of an employee's alcoholism); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191,
194-95, 331 P.2d 814, 820 (1958) (physician's disclosure to parents of daughter
contemplating marriage with physician's former patient of the patient's trouble
in school, trouble with authorities, and difficulty in handling finances).
73. See Medical Practice,supra note 35, at 954-55.
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yield. This question must be resolved by balancing the conflicting
interests involved. In applying a balancing test to the statutory requirement of notice, the physician's primary concern is whether the
duty to notify parents, in the interest of public and private health, is
greater than the duty to maintain confidential professional
communication.
Proponents of parental notification contend that the notice requirement furthers the state's interest in ensuring that parents are
given the opportunity to participate in an important and potentially
traumatic decision in the life of their minor daughter, thus promoting family dialogue and harmony.7 4 The Illinois General Assembly,
as one of its findings, concluded that parents ordinarily possess information essential to a physician's exercise of his best medical
judgment concerning the child.7 5 Parents who were aware that
their minor daughter was seeking an abortion would be better able
to ensure that she received adequate medical treatment.
74. One author asserts that the family unit has long been recognized as the
social backbone of our society. See Comment, Minor's Right of Privacy: Access
to Contraceptives Without ParentalNotification, 7 J. Juv. LAW 99, 103 (1983).
Until a minor reaches the age of maturity, the parents are the ones who are
morally, legally and financially responsible for their minor children. Moreover,
one of the essential components of a well-functioning family is trust. When a
family member breaches that trust, however, the entire family structure is undermined. Thus, the author contends that when a parent is not involved in a
minor's decision "to bear or beget," trust is destroyed, family solidarity is weakened, and parental control is undermined or severely threatened. Id. at 104.
Parents and interest groups have reacted to this threat by challenging the
right of minor children to obtain abortions and contraceptive services without
at least parental notification. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (challenge by minor to Utah statute requiring physician to notify, if possible, the
parent or guardian of any minor upon whom an abortion is to be performed);
Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich.), vacated and remanded, 559 F.2d
1219 (6th Cir. 1977), affd on remand, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977), rev'd,
615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980) (challenge by parents
against administrators of publically operated family planning centers and
health department to prevent distribution of contraceptive devices and medications without prior parental notification).
75. The Illinois General Assembly found that:
1) immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices
that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences, 2) the
medical, emotional and psychological consequences of abortion are serious
and can be lasting, particularly when the patient is immature, 3) the capacity to become pregnant and the capacity for mature judgment concerning
the wisdom of an abortion are not necessarily related, 4) parents ordinarily
possess information essential to a physician's exercise of his best medical
judgment concerning the children, and 5) parents who are aware that their
minor daughter has had an abortion may better ensure that she receives
adequate medical attention after her abortion. The legislature further
finds that parental consultation is usually desirable and in the best interests of the minor.
1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. at 5340 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8162(b)(1)-(5)).
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Parental notification of a minor's abortion decision, however,
may have exactly the opposite effect. In many cases, the notice requirement will cause family disharmony because it will inform parents who may oppose their daughter's decision to obtain an
abortion. 76 Yet, those parents are legally powerless to prevent their
daughter from obtaining an abortion.7 7 This fear of parental notification may thus cause some minor women to delay the abortion
past the first trimester, significantly increasing the health risks.7 8
Other pregnant minors may attempt to self-abort or to obtain an
illegal abortion rather than risk parental notification.7 9 Still others
76. See supra notes 31, 32 and 33.
77. In Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 427 U.S. at 75, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Missouri parental consent requirement
for all unmarried minors under the age of 18. Because the constitutional analysis applicable to parental consent statutes is similarly applicable to parental notification provisions, as a practical matter a notification requirement has the
same effect as a parental consent statute; a third party cannot legally prevent a

pregnant minor woman from obtaining an abortion.

78. See Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp.
542, 548 (Me. 1979) (affidavits showing parental notice "may cause an adolescent
to delay seeking assistance with her pregnancy, increasing the hazardousness of
an abortion should she choose one"); Bracken & Kasl, Delay in Seeking Induced Abortion: A Review and Theoretical Analysis, 121 AM. J. OBSTET. &
GYNECOL. 1008, 1013 (1975) (second trimester abortions demand techniques
which have a higher risk of complications than first trimester techniques);
Hoffman, Consent and Confidentiality and Their Legal and Ethical Implicationsfor Adolescent Medicine, in MEDICAL CARE OF THE ADOLESCENT 42, 51 (J.
Gallagher, F. Heald & J. Garrell 3d ed. 1976) (pregnancy increases risks to minor's emotional and physical health).
A minor who decides to abort after the first trimester of pregnancy faces
more serious health risks than if she had aborted during the first trimester.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Benditt, Second-Trimester Abortion in the
United States, 11 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 358 (1979) ("abortions after 12 weeks of
gestation are more dangerous, emotionally disruptive and ethically troubling
than those performed earlier"); Cates, Schultz, Crimes & Taylor, Abortion
Methods: Morbidity, Costs & Emotional Imput: The Effect of Delay and Method
Choice on the Risk of Abortion Morbidity, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 266, 267 (1979)
(after 12 weeks gestation, the suction curettage, dilation and evacuation, saline
instillation, and PG instillation methods of abortion have more total and major
complications than any period in the first 12 weeks).
A minor who decides to bear the child after the first trimester faces greater
health risks than if she had a first trimester abortion. Cates & Tietze, Standardized Mortality Rates Associated with Legal Abortion: United States 19721975, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 109 (1978) (abortion within first 16 weeks of pregnancy safer than carrying pregnancy to term); Zackler, Andelman & Baver, The
Young Adolescent as an Obstetric Risk, 103 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 305, 311
(1969) ("teenage girls do not behave as well obstetrically even with good care as
do adult women do").
79. Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542,
548 (Me. 1979) (affidavits that minor may turn to illegal abortion rather than
have parents notified); Alice v. Department of Social Welfare, 55 Cal. App. 3d
1039, 1044, 128 Cal. Rptr. 374, 377 (1976) (affidavit that minor may seek to abort
herself); A. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE
285 (1977) ("consequences of refusal to perform an abortion on a minor may be
very serious, since a girl intent on abortion is quite likely, if denied one by a
physician, to turn to an illegal abortion or attempt to abort herself"); Kahin,
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may forego an abortion and bear an unwanted child, which may be
extremely burdensome given the minor's education, employment
skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity.8 0 Because most
minors will not want their parents to be notified of their abortion
decision, there is a high probability that such adverse health consequences could develop. Accordingly, the minor's interest in maintaining confidentiality in childbearing decisions should override the
state's interest in obtaining parental involvement in these
situations.
Duty to Disclose Under Compulsion of Law
Under certain circumstances, a physician may have a duty imposed by law to disclose confidential information about his patient.8 1 If a statute requires a physician to disclose medical
information otherwise confidential, the physician should not be
held accountable for such disclosure.8 2 In short, a presumption of
justification for disclosure exists. Under the Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act, a physician must notify parents of a minor's abor83
tion decision before additional medical services will be provided.
As a result, a minor cannot assert a breach of confidentiality against
Baker, & Freeman, The Effect of Legalized Abortion on Morbidity Resulting
from Criminal Abortion, 121 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 114 (1975) (illegal
abortion rates drop when legal abortion available). See also Teicher, A Solution
to the Chronic Problem of Living: Adolescent Attempted Suicide, in CURRENT
ISSUES IN ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 129, 136 (J. Schoolar ed. 1973) (approxi-

mately one-fourth of female minors who commit suicide do so because they
either are or believe they are pregnant).
The potential health implications which may arise because of parental notification is dramatically seen in an abortion survey taken by the Alan
Guttmacher Institute. In 1978, 184,000 teenagers under the age of 17 obtained
an abortion. The survey indicated that:
If parental notification requirements were adopted by all abortion providers, an additional 39,000 young people might be expected to inform their
parents about their decision to have an abortion. An even higher number,
however-42,000--would not obtain a legal abortion. Some 19,000 of these
could be expected to attempt to obtain an illegal abortion or to induce the
abortion themselves-both, desparate and dangerous alternatives. Another
18,000 would have an unwanted birth and, based on the teenagers' reports
in this survey, another 5,000 would run away from home, presumably to
have an unwanted birth or to obtain an illegal abortion.
Torres, Forest, and Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents'
Use of Family Planningand Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERsps. 284, 291
(Nov.-Dec. 1980).
80. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (Bellotti II). See also Note,
Due Process and Equal Protection: ConstitutionalImplications ofAbortion Notice and Reporting Requirements, 56 B.U.L. REV. 522, 531 (1976) (abortion notice statute may subject women to "draconian choice" by forcing them either to
bear an unwanted child and suffer the accompanying physical and psychological
harm or to endure the stigma and trauma inherent in notification).
81. See Medical Secrecy, supra note 30, at 114.
82. See Physicians and Surgeons, supra note 19, at 670.
83. See supra note 4.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:475

a physician for merely complying with a statutory duty. However,
this presumption of justification under compulsion of law can be
rebutted.
It has been suggested, for example, that statutes of questionable societal value, such as a law requiring disclosure of nonmarital
pregnancies, raise serious questions as to whether the obligation of
84
In light of
disclosure would supersede the duty of confidentiality.
the previous analysis that a minor's interest in confidentiality may
outweigh any public health interest in notification, the societal
value of the Illinois statute is questionable. The physician's defense
of compliance with a statutory duty may also fail because Illinois'
parental reporting requirements do not impose a mandatory duty
on the physician. Because a physician is only required to notify a
parent if he subsequently decides to perform an abortion, parental
notice requirements are distinguishable from other reporting regulations. For example, physicians coming in contact with an abused
or neglected child or a person suffering from injury caused by a vio85
This
lent wound are required to report to the proper authority.
renphysician
the
reporting
whether
of
regardless
is
absolute
duty
ders further treatment or assistance. Because there is no such affirmative duty with respect to the Illinois statutory provision, it is
unclear as to whether the justification of compulsion under law will
protect a physician who complies with this parental notice
requirement.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NOTIFICATION: BREACH OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN
CONFIDENTIALITY?

Physicians are not only confronted with possible legal liability
for giving parental notice, but they also face the conflict that parental notification may require physicians to breach applicable codes of
medical ethics. Each physician upon entering the medical profession takes the Hippocratic Oath. The Hippocratic Oath, which has
long stood as the ethical guide of the medical profession, provides
that "[w]hatever in connection with my professional practice, or not
in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought
not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all
84. See Medical Secrecy, supra note 30, at 114.
85. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (1978) (sexual molestation,
death, abuse, physical neglect); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18960 (West Supp.

1984) (child abuse); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (1983) (abused or neglected
child); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West 1984) (physical abuse, neglect, sexual
abuse); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (1984) (wound, injury, disability or physical
and mental condition caused by abuse, neglect or brutality).
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such should be kept secret. '8 6 This pledge has been affirmed in the
Principles of Medical Ethics promulgated by the American Medical
Association. Principle Nine provides:
A physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the
course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the
character of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or unless it
becomes necessary or8 in
order to protect the welfare of the individual
7
or of the community.

The Hippocratic Oath and Section Nine of the Principles of Medical
Ethics indicate that the physician's pledge of confidentiality to the
patient is qualified by exceptions for compulsory disclosure and the
protection of society or the individual. These exceptions thus pose
serious ethical considerations for the physician who must exercise

judgment and discretion in deciding whether they apply to parental
88

notification legislation.

Many physicians consider their professional responsibility to
the minor to entail not only pregnancy treatment, including an
abortion, but also the preservation of confidentiality. Critics of
mandatory disclosure contend that laws and policies requiring parental notification have little benefit to teenagers or society, but
serve instead to intensify the existing problems presently associated
with teenage pregnancy and childbirth.8 9 Although it is preferable
that physicians persuade a minor herself to inform her parents,
thereby satisfying the requisite notice, where this is unlikely and it
appears that without the physician's promise not to notify her par-

ents the minor will delay the abortion beyond the first trimester,
the medical welfare of the minor must be paramount. 90

Conse-

86. Oath of Hippocrates 400 B.C., cited in Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328,
332, 181 A.2d 345, 347 (1982). See also L. EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH
(1943).
87.

PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N, § 9

(1957), cited in Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d at 347.
88. Cooper, The Physician'sDilemma: Protectionof the Patient'sRight to
Privacy, 22 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 397, 411 (1978).
89. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 3605-614. See also note 32 supra (discussing emotional distress caused by parental notification).
90. This ethical consideration is analagous to a similar concern involving a
physician's liability for treating venereal disease without parental consent. The
AMA declared in the American Medical Association (AMA) News of April 17,
1967:
The inability to obtain parental consent to treat a minor for venereal disease should not cause a physician to withhold treatment if, in his professional judgment, treatment is immediately required ....
It is, of course,
better if the physician can persuade the minor to inform his parents and
thereby provide the necessary consent. But where this is impossible and it
appears that without the physician's promise of confidentiality the youth
will probably delay seeking treatment, the youth's health is paramount to
any other considerations.
AMA NEWS, April 17, 1967, at 4, cited in Holder, TreatingA Minor For Venereal Disease, 214 J. AM. MED. A. 1949 (1970). Under the AMA's reasoning,
where minors would delay an abortion, attempt to self-abort, or obtain an ille-
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quently, the ethics of the medical profession, as well as a physician's
own conscience, may compel a physician to refrain from notifying a
minor's parents if he believes notice will not be in the minor's best
interest. Thus, when notice has the effect of either postponing or
effectively denying altogether a minor's access to an abortion, a
physician's disclosure may not be morally or ethically justified.91
Yet, failure to comply with the Act would subject a physician to
threats of criminal sanctions, including fines, imprisonment, and
92
loss of license.
RESOLVING THE PHYSICIAN'S DILEMMA
Under the parental notification statute drafted by the Illinois
General Assembly, physicians who perform an abortion upon a minor will face a legal and ethical dilemma. While physicians may
recognize a need to perform an abortion upon a minor, they may
choose not to do so out of a concern for their legal liability. Even
though they may not consider the legal consequences in making
their decisions, physicians still face a conflict in balancing the moral
gal abortion rather than risk parental notification, the primary obligation of the
physician is to his patient. In this type of "emergency situation," physicians
would be compelled to maintain confidentiality.
91. This argument of moral "conscientiousness" over legal obligation has
some merit if it is looked at through a balancing of interests approach. For
example, a state attempting to restrict a minor's confidential access to an abortion will assert a number of interests it seeks to protect. One interest is to protect the minor's health by decreasing the risk that a physician will administer
medical services without considering past medical history. A second interest is
to reduce uninformed decisions due to a lack of parental involvement. Finally,
the state attempts to prevent a negative impact on a minor's moral welfare.
Note, Minor's Right to Confidential Access to Contraceptives, 47 ALB. L. REV.
214, 218 (1982). The state will then balance these interests with other asserted
interests and conclude that parental involvement through consent or notice
should be exercised. However, the interests the state asserts are geared purportedly to the minor's best interests. Similarly, so is the physician's interest.
Therefore, if a physician, truly acting in the minor's best interests, feels that
notice should not be given, the minor's "best interests" should outweigh the
state's interest in parental notice.
92. Section 8 of the Act provides:
Any person who intentionally performs an abortion with knowledge that,
or with reckless disregard as to whether the person upon whom the abortion is to be performed is an unemancipated minor or an incompetent, and
who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to conform to any requirement of this Act, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
Failure to provide persons with information pursuant to the requirements of this act is prima facie evidence of failure to obtain informed consent and of interference with family relations in appropriate civil actions.
The law of this State shall not be construed to preclude the award of exemplary damages in any appropriate civil action relevant to violations of this
Act. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the common law rights
of parents.
1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. at 5343 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8168).
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and ethical implications of the minor's privacy right to receive confidential medical treatment with the right of the parents to supervise their minor children and the interest of the state in promoting
the parental nurturing role.93 The fundamental importance of the

role of physicians as providers of adolescent medical health care demands that this dilemma be resolved.
For the most part, physicians are unable to resolve the dilemma
by themselves. Under the existing parental notification requirement, physicians are forced to make their decision in an area in
which they cannot safely rely on their own discretion. The most
practical approach for resolving the dilemma would be to address
the problem directly by legislation. A case-by-case analysis would
do little in terms of offering guidelines for future conduct. There
are several possible legislative solutions which may eliminate the
physician's conflicting duties with regard to parental notification.
Legislative immunity is a viable and straightforward solution.
The Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act, unlike other reporting
statutes, does not insulate the physician with an immunity for properly notifying parents. Most other states, however, have statutes
which qualify the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship by imposing an affirmative duty on a physician to disclose or
report cases of communicable disease, 94 wounds caused by violence, 95 or child abuse or neglect. 96 Under these reporting statutes,
communications between physician and patient are no longer privileged matters secured against disclosure. 97 Illinois has similar re93. See infra notes 104 and 105 (discussing parental, minor, and state interests involved in the abortion decision).
94. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-621 (1974) (epidemic, infections,
contagious disease); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 119 (1975) (venereal disease); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(54) (Callaghan 1980) (critical health problems,
including lead poisoning and Roue's Syndrome); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 292.340
(Vernon 1965) (disease or illness from physician's examination of employees
carrying on any process, manufacture, or labor of zinc, copper, lead or other
poisonous chemicals); N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:4-38 (West 1964) (venereal disease);
VA. CODE § 32.1-35 (1950) (disease caused by exposure to toxic substances).
95. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (West 1982) (wound or injury inflicted by knife, gun, pistol, or other deadly weapon); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 206-3.2 (1983) (injury resulting from discharge of firearms or injury sustained
in commission of or as a victim of a criminal offense); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 112, § 12A (1975) (bullet wound, gunshot wound, powder burn, or wound or
injury caused by a knife or sharp or pointed instrument if, in the physician's
opinion, a criminal act was involved); VA. CODE § 54-276.10 (1982) (wound inflicted by pistol, revolver, knife, razor, blackjack).
96. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (Supp. 1984) (sexual molestation, death, abuse, physical neglect); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18960 (West
Supp. 1984) (child abuse); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (1983) (abused or neglected child); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Supp. 1984) (physical abuse,
neglect, sexual abuse); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (1984) (wound, injury, disability or physical and mental condition caused by abuse, neglect or brutality).
97. The Arizona statute, which is reflective of most reporting statutes,
provides:
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porting statutes. For example, the Department of Public Aid
compels a physician having reasonable cause to believe a child
known to him in his professional capacity to be an abused or neglected child to report the case. 98 Accordingly, the statutory provision expressly provides for immunity to the physician for proper
disclosure. 99 In addition to providing immunity in the child abuse
area, Illinois also grants a statutory immunity to a physician for
good faith disclosure of communicable diseases. 100
The reporting statutes are significant because a physician acting in good faith has no fear of a civil suit for unauthorized disclosure. In view of the legislature's desire to protect a physician who is
required to make certain types of disclosures, it is unclear why the
legislature failed to attach a similar provision to the Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act. Therefore, the rational method for eliminating the physician's legal dilemma is to amend the Act to include
a provision expressly granting immunity to a physician who properly notifies a minor's parents of their minor daughter's decision to
terminate pregnancy.
[T]he physician-patient privilege. . . [as it relates] to the competency of the
witness and to the exclusion of confidential communications, shall not pertain in any civil or criminal litigation in which a child's neglect, dependency, abuse or abandonment is an issue nor in any judicial proceeding
resulting from a report submitted pursuant to this section.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(D) (Supp. 1984).
98. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (1983). This section further provides
that "[t]he privileged quality of communication between any professional person required to report and his patient or client shall not apply to situations
involving abused or neglected children and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report as required by this Act." Id. (emphasis added). For an excellent
discussion of the Illinois statute, see Note, Privileged Communications-Abrogation of the Physician-PatientPrivilege to Protect the Battered Child, 15 DE
PAUL L. REV. 453 (1966).
99. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2059 (1983). This statutory provision reads:
Any person, institution or agency, under this Act, participating in good
faith in the making of a report, or in the investigation of such a report or in
the taking of photographs and x-rays or in the retaining a child in temporary protective custody shall have immunity from any liability, civil, criminal or that otherwise might result by reason of such actions. For the
purpose of any proceedings, civil or criminal, the good faith of any persons
required to report, or permitted to report, cases of suspected child abuse or
neglect under this Act, shall be presumed.
Id. (emphasis added).
100. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 126, § 21 (1983). This statutory provision
provides:
Whenever any statute of this State or any ordinance or resolution of a municipal corporation or political subdivision enacted pursuant to statute or
any rule of an administrative agency adopted pursuant to statute requires
medical practitioners or other persons to report cases of communicable diseases, including venereal diseases, to any governmental agency or officer,
such reports shall be confidential, and any medical practitioner or other
person making such report in good faith shall be immune from suit for
slander or libel based upon any statements contained in such report.
Id. (emphasis added).
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While legislative immunity may resolve the problem of liability
for notifying parents, physicians still encounter a number of ethical
and professional considerations. One reasonable approach to eliminate this ethical dilemma is to grant the physician limited discretion to refuse to notify parents. This approach could be patterned
after a similar Illinois statutory provision relating to the treatment
of minors for chemical abuse or venereal disease. 1 1 This statutory
provision gives physicians providing diagnosis or treatment to minor patients who come into contact with venereal disease or who
suffer from drug or alcohol abuse discretion to inform the minor's
parents or guardian of any treatment given. 10 2 This provision further indicates that with the minor's consent a physician shall make
a reasonable attempt to involve the family in the minor's treatment
if the physician believes family involvement will not be detrimental
10 3
to the progress and care of the minor.
MODEL PARENTAL NOTICE STATUTE

The drafters of the Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act have
dealt with the confidentiality issue inherent in parental notification
requirements by balancing the interests of the state 0 4 and the par101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 4505 (1983) provides:
Any physician who provides diagnosis or treatment or any licensed clinical
psychologist or professionally trained social worker with a master's degree
or any addiction aid or addiction specialist employed by the Dangerous
Drugs Commission or by units of local government or by agencies or organizations operating drug abuse programs funded or licensed by the Federal
Government or the State of Illinois or any qualified person employed by or
associated with any public or private alcoholism program licensed by the
State of Illinois who provides counseling to a minor patient who has come
into contact with any venereal disease or suffers from the use of any drug
or narcotic or from alcohol consumption referred to in Section 4 of this Act
may, but shall not be obligated to, inform the parent, parents, or guardians
of any minor as to the treatment given or needed.
Any such person shall, upon the minor's consent, make reasonable efforts to involve the family of such minor in his or her treatment, if the
person furnishing such treatment believes that the involvement of the family will not be detrimental to the progress and care of such minor. Reasonable effort shall be extended to assist the minor in accepting the
involvement of his or her family in the care and treatment being given.
However, in any instance in which a minor above the age of 12 years is
being treated for alcohol use the person furnishing such treatment shall
notify the parent or guardian of such minor following the second treatment
of such alcohol use unless in that person's professional judgment such notification would jeopardize the course of treatment being pursued. In no
case, however, shall a period of more than three months elapse without the
parent or guardian of said minor being notified of the treatment afforded.
Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The state has four primary interests. The first is the societal interest in
developing the minor into a useful citizen. Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Minors' Access to Contraceptives-FreedFrom Future Restraints, 24 U. FLA. L.
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ents' 0 5 against the minor's right of privacy. The present Act is deficient, however, because of its failure to consider the physician's
obligations in connection with this confidentiality issue. In order to
REV. 1019, 1020 (1977). The second interest is protecting the minor. The state
attempts to ensure that the decision whether "to bear or beget" is an informed
one, thus protecting the minor from the physical and emotional hazards of unwanted pregnancies. Id. The third interest is in preserving the family as a viable and stable unit in society. Because the family is the primary unit through
which social values and moral precepts are transmitted to the young, the state
has an interest in not undermining that unit. Comment, Minor's Right of Privacy: Access to Contraceptives Without Parental Notification, 7 J. Juv. LAW
111-12 (1983). Finally, the state has an interest in protecting prenatal life and
safeguarding maternal health. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973). See also
Comment, The Maine Abortion Statutes of 1979: Testing the Constitutional
Limits, 32 ME. L. REV. 315 (1980). The author articulates additional state interests when a minor is making a major emotional decision, such as the decision to
terminate a pregnancy. These interests include encouraging familial rather
than judicial resolution of a minor's abortion decision, insuring the minor's best
interests, increasing the probability for a fully informed decision, maintaining
parental control, and preserving a family harmony. Id. at 344-45.
Section 2 of the Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act declares the legislative intent in enacting the parental notice provisions: to further the compelling
state interests of (1) protecting minors against their own immaturity, (2) fostering the family structure and preserving it as a viable social unit, and (3) protecting the rights of parents to rear children who are members of their household.
1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. at 5340 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8162).
105. In choosing to enact legislation restricting or burdening a minor's right
to have confidential access to abortions or contraceptives, the state or federal
government has concluded that the child's interest in confidentiality is weaker
than the parents' interest in guiding and controlling their child. One commentator points out that there are two decisions implicit in a state's choice that
parental interests should prevail over a minor's privacy interest in obtaining
abortions or contraceptives. See Note, ParentalConsent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001
(1975). First, the state must have decided that the family is an important social
unit which deserves to be maintained. There are a number of strong state and
parental interests in maintaining the family. The family is the basic institution
in which the socialization and education of the child occur. The family unit also
provides its members with support, guidance, respect, love and affection. Second, the state must have concluded that the family structure would be undermined by permitting minors to decide for themselves whether to terminate
pregnancy or to engage in contraceptive use. Id. at 1015. See also Comment,
ParentalNotification as a Prerequisitefor Minors'Access to Contraceptives: A
Behavioral And Legal Analysis, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 196 (1979) (discussing
manner in which interest of minors, parents, and the state should be balanced).
Parents have the primary responsibility for guiding their child's upbringing. This has resulted in a strong parental interest in maintaining the family
structure. Accordingly, the rights of parents to supervise and direct the rearing
of their children free from governmental influence has been firmly established
by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1964)
(parents' authority to direct the rearing of their children in their own household is basic in the structure of American society); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944) (right of parents to the custody, care, and nurture of their children is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state attempt to bar all private education
violated the freedom of parents to direct the raising of their children); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (parents have the principal responsibility for the
care and supervision of their children).
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take into account the physician's professional and legal obligation to
preserve the confidentiality of information acquired within the physician-patient relationship, this comment proposes a flexible standard which defers to the physician's good-faith judgment but
provides for notice in emergencies. Section 4(a) of the Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act should thus be amended as follows:
§ 4(a): Where medical services are for the treatment of contraception
and pregnancy, including abortion, the physician should seek and obtain the minor's permission to notify her parents of such treatment.
1. If the minor-patient objects to notification, the physician should
not notify the parents that treatment will be provided unless he or she
concludes that failing to inform the parents could seriously jeopardize
the health of the minor, taking into consideration:
a. The impact that such notification could have on the course of
treatment;
b. The medical considerations which require such notification;
c. The nature, basis, and strength of the minor's objections; and
d. The extent to which parental involvement in the course of treatment is required or desired.
2. A physician who concludes that notification of the parent is medically required should:
a. Indicate the medical justifications in the minor-patient's file; and
b. Inform the parent only after making all reasonable efforts to
persuade the minor to consent to notification of the parent.
3. If a physician, acting in good faith, concludes that notification of
the parent is medically required, the physician shall have immunity
from liability, civil
or criminal or otherwise that might result by reason
10 6
of notification.
Under this approach to parental notification, physicians would
have reasonable discretion to decide when, if ever, state and paren106. Subsections (1) and (2) of the Model Parental Notice Statute are patterned after provisions of the Standards Relating to Rights of Minors portion of
the Institute of Judicial Administration/American Bar Association Juvenile
Justice Standards Project (Standards). The drafters of the Standards concluded
that the importance of the privacy interests of teenagers and the social importance of making contraceptive services and pregnancy treatment, including
abortion, readily available to teenagers mandates allowing treatment without
notification. Standards 4.2, 4.8 and commentary. The Notification Provisions of
Standards 4.2 and 4.8 have been proposed by commentators as a solution for
balancing the competing interest in this area. One commentator contends that:
The [standards] approach to parental notification accepts as a general rule
that parental involvement with medical treatment of children is appropriate. However, in certain areas-such as treatment for pregnancy and contraceptive services-the child's interest in needed treatment and society's
interest in treatment outweigh any state or parental interest in family involvement. This is true only if the child objects to notification and if the
treating physician concludes that lack of notification does not pose a threat
of serious harm to the health of the child. If parental notification is medically necessary, the physician may notify over the objections of the [non]consenting child. Otherwise, the child's wishes will be respected.
Buchanan, The Constitution and the Anamoly of the Pregnant Teenager, 24
ARIZ. L. REV. 553, 608 (1982).
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tal interests in favor of notice outweigh their patient's interest in
confidentiality. If it is the physician's good-faith belief that the minor's best interest would be served by notifying the minor's parents
of any medical treatment to be given, then the physician may, without fear of legal or ethical ramifications, make this fact known to
the parents. But, if the physician, in the exercise of his or her best
medical judgment believes it is not in the minor's best interest that
her parents be notified, then the physician should not have any ethical or moral misgivings about refusing to give notice.
CONCLUSION

The Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act places a heavy burden on the medical profession. Not only does the Act limit the protection of confidentiality between physician and patient, but it fails
to afford adequate protection for physicians. With the public policy
reflected in privileged communication, physician licensing statutes,
and the medical profession's code of ethics on the obligation of confidentiality, a physician who complies with the requirement of giving notice may be subjected to a lawsuit. Similarly, in situations
where protection of confidential medical information outweighs societal interests in disclosure, parental notification may compel physicians to breach their ethical and moral obligation to preserve
confidentiality in administering medical treatment. A physician
who attempts to comply with parental notice regulations is thus in
an unenviable position of uncertainty. To eliminate such uncertainty, the Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act should be amended
to expressly grant immunity to a physician for his or her disclosure
of this confidential medical information. To eliminate any ethical
qualms, this immunity should also be combined with a physician's
right to exercise good-faith discretion in deciding whether to notify
parents. The legislative directions set forth herein will not only
protect the patient's right of confidentiality, but they will also minimize a physician's potential liability for disclosure. Moreover, this
legislation would be consistent with applicable medical ethics codes
which recognize that protection of confidential medical information
should be balanced against societal interests in disclosure.
Edward Eshoo, Jr.

